

Nonmonotonic Reasoning with Infeasible Worlds

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(based on joint work with Christoph Beierle, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Thomas Meyer)

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- ▶ What can weakly consistent belief bases encode that strongly consistent belief can't?
- ▶ How can we extend inference operators that assume strongly consistent belief bases to also reason from weakly consistent belief bases?
 - ▶ System W → system W^+
 - ▶ c-Inference → extended c-inference

1. Background inductive inference operators
2. Strong and weak consistency
3. Reasoning with infeasible worlds
4. Introduce system W^+
5. Introduce extended c-inference

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- ▶ $(B|A)$ verified by ω if $\omega \models AB$
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Example (belief base)

$\Delta = \{(b|p), (f|b), (\neg f|p)\}$ “Penguin triangle”

Ranking Functions as Models for Conditionals

Definition (Ranking function [Spohn 1988])

Function $\kappa : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0 \cup \{\infty\}$ such that $\kappa^{-1}(0) \neq \emptyset$.

Intuition: more plausible worlds have lower ranks.
Worlds with rank ∞ are completely infeasible.

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Example (ranking function)

ω	pbf	$pb\bar{f}$	$p\bar{b}f$	$p\bar{b}\bar{f}$	$\bar{p}bf$	$\bar{p}b\bar{f}$	$\bar{p}\bar{b}f$	$\bar{p}\bar{b}\bar{f}$
$\kappa(\omega)$	2	1	∞	∞	0	1	0	0

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Inductive inference operator [Kern-Isberner, Beierle, Brewka 2020]

A mapping $C : \Delta \mapsto \vdash_\Delta$ that maps each belief base to an inference relation such that

(DI) if $(B|A) \in \Delta$ then $A \vdash_\Delta B$ and

(TV) if $\Delta = \emptyset$ and $A \vdash_\Delta B$ then $A \models B$.

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Examples:

- ▶ p-entailment [Kraus, Lehmann, Magidor 1990] / system P [Adams 1965]
- ▶ system Z [Pearl 1990] / rational closure [Lehmann 1989]
- ▶ (skeptical) c-inference [Beierle, Eichhorn, Kern-Isberner 2016]

Strongly and Weakly Consistent Belief Bases

Definition (strongly consistent)

Δ is **strongly** consistent if there is a κ with $\kappa \models \Delta$ and $\kappa^{-1}(\infty) = \emptyset$.

Definition (weakly consistent)

Δ is **weakly** consistent if there is a κ with $\kappa \models \Delta$.

(Note: Δ is weakly consistent iff $\top \not\models_{\Delta}^p \perp$.)

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Strong consistency is used, e.g., in [Goldszmidt Pearl 1996]

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What is the difference between strong and weak consistency?

Consistency of Belief Bases

Δ is **strongly** consistent if
there is a κ with $\kappa \models \Delta$ and $\kappa^{-1}(\infty) = \emptyset$.

Example

$\Delta = \{(B|A), (\overline{B}|A)\}$ is inconsistent.

Only defeasible beliefs,
every formula can be somewhat plausible.

Δ is **weakly** consistent if
there is a κ with $\kappa \models \Delta$.

Example

$\Delta = \{(B|A), (\overline{B}|A)\}$ is consistent.

But it requires that A is unfeasible under any
condition.

Might contain “strict” constraints.

Weakly Consistent Belief Bases and “Strict” Beliefs

“Strict” beliefs / hard constraints can be expressed by defeasible conditionals [KLM90]:

strictly A corresponds to $(\perp | \overline{A})$
 $\overline{A} \sim \perp$

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Observation: Belief bases that are not strongly consistent contain strict beliefs.

Proposition

For a belief base Δ that is not strongly consistent there is at least one world ω with $\omega \sim_{\Delta}^p \perp$.

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For a belief base Δ that is not strongly consistent there is at least one world ω with $\omega \sim_{\Delta}^p \perp$.

→ Every preferential inference relation satisfying (DI) wrt. a Δ that is not strongly consistent contains strict beliefs.

Extending Inference Operators for Weakly Consistent Belief Bases

Observation

Some inference operators are defined for all belief bases (p-entailment, rational closure, ...)
Some inference operators are only defined for strongly consistent belief bases (system W, c-inf.)

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Fill this gap by extending inference operators to handle infeasible worlds;
here done for

- ▶ **system W** (cf. [Haldimann, Beierle, Kern-Isberner, Meyer 2023]) and
- ▶ **c-inference** (cf. [Haldimann, Beierle, Kern-Isberner 2023]).

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Observation

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Now: extend system W to cover *all* belief bases → **System W⁺**

Tolerance Partition

Inclusion maximal tolerance partition [Pearl 1990; Goldszmidt, Pearl 1996]

$EZP(\Delta) = (\Delta^0, \dots, \Delta^k, \Delta^\infty)$ with ...

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Preferred structure on worlds

ξ^j, ξ , preferred structure $<_{\Delta}^{w+}$ on worlds

$\Delta = \{r_i = (B_i|A_i) \mid i \in \{1, \dots, n\}\}$ with $EZP(\Delta) = (\Delta^1, \dots, \Delta^k, \Delta^\infty)$.

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Feasible worlds: $\Omega^{feas} = \Omega \setminus \{\omega \mid \xi^\infty(\omega) \neq \emptyset\}$
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Preferred structure on worlds: $(\Omega^{feas}, <_{\Delta}^{w+})$
 $<_{\Delta}^{w+} \subseteq \Omega^{feas} \times \Omega^{feas}$ defined by, for any $\omega, \omega' \in \Omega$,

$\omega <_{\Delta}^{w+} \omega'$ iff there exists $m \in \{0, \dots, k\}$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} \xi^i(\omega) &= \xi^i(\omega') \quad \forall i \in \{m+1, \dots, k\}, \text{ and} \\ \xi^m(\omega) &\subsetneq \xi^m(\omega'). \end{aligned}$$

System W^+ – Definition

System W^+, \sim_{Δ}^{w+}

$$A \sim_{\Delta}^{w+} B$$

if for every **feasible** $\omega' \in \Omega_{A\bar{B}}$ there is a **feasible** $\omega \in \Omega_{AB}$ such that $\omega <_{\Delta}^{w+} \omega'$.

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→ Especially $A \vdash_{\Delta}^{w+} \perp$.

This introduces strict beliefs into the induced inference relation.

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
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
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Entailment: e.g. $\bar{a}b \vee a\bar{b} \sim_{\Delta}^{w+} \bar{a}b$

Proposition

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(Classic Preservation)
- 😊 ✓ System W^+ complies with syntax splitting.

Definition (SPO on worlds)

An *SPO on worlds* is a tuple (Ω^{feas}, \prec) consisting of

- ▶ a set $\Omega^{feas} \subseteq \Omega_{\Sigma}$ of *feasible* worlds and
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Lifted to formulas:

- ▶ A is *feasible* if at least one model of A is feasible.
- ▶ $A \prec B$ iff for every $\omega' \in \Omega_B \cap \Omega^{feas}$ there is an $\omega \in \Omega_A \cap \Omega^{feas}$ such that $\omega \prec \omega'$.

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As a model for conditionals:

$$(\Omega^{feas}, \prec) \models (B|A), \text{ if either } A\overline{B} \text{ is infeasible} \\ \text{or } AB \text{ and } A\overline{B} \text{ are both feasible and } AB \prec A\overline{B}.$$

Extended c-Inference

Let $\Delta = \{(B_1|A_1), \dots, (B_n|A_n)\}$ over Σ .

Definition (c-representation [Kern-Isberner 2001; 2004])

A *c-representation* of Δ is a ranking function $\kappa_{\vec{\eta}}$ constructed from impacts $\vec{\eta} = (\eta_1, \dots, \eta_n)$ with $\eta_i \in \mathbb{N}_0$ assigned to each conditional $(B_i|A_i)$ such that $\kappa_{\vec{\eta}}$ accepts Δ and is given by:

$$\kappa_{\vec{\eta}}(\omega) = \sum_{1 \leq i \leq n; \omega \models A_i \overline{B}_i} \eta_i.$$

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Extended c-Representations: Example

Let $\Sigma = \{b, p, f\}$ and $\Delta = \{(b|p), (f|b), (\bar{b}|p)\}$.

ω	$(b p)$	$(f b)$	$(\bar{b} p)$	impact on ω
bpf	v	v	f	η_3
$b\bar{p}\bar{f}$	v	f	f	$\eta_2 + \eta_3$
$b\bar{p}f$	—	v	—	0
$\bar{b}\bar{p}\bar{f}$	—	f	—	η_2
$\bar{b}p\bar{f}$	f	—	v	η_1
$\bar{b}p\bar{f}$	f	—	v	η_1
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ω	$(b p)$	$(f b)$	$(\bar{b} p)$	impact on ω	$\kappa_{\vec{\eta}}(\omega)$
bpf	v	v	f	η_3	∞
$bp\bar{f}$	v	f	f	$\eta_2 + \eta_3$	∞
$b\bar{p}f$	—	v	—	0	0
$b\bar{p}\bar{f}$	—	f	—	η_2	1
$\bar{b}pf$	f	—	v	η_1	∞
$\bar{b}p\bar{f}$	f	—	v	η_1	∞
$\bar{b}\bar{p}f$	—	—	—	0	0
$\bar{b}\bar{p}\bar{f}$	—	—	—	0	0
impacts:	η_1	η_2	η_3		
$\vec{\eta}$	∞	1	∞		

Proposition (Coincidence for strongly consistent KBs)

Let Δ be strongly consistent.

Every c-representation $\kappa_{\vec{\eta}}$ of Δ is an extended c-representation of Δ .

Properties of Extended c-Representations

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Then $\kappa_{\vec{\eta}}$ with $\vec{\eta} = (\infty, \dots, \infty)$ is an extended c-representation of Δ .

Proposition (Classic Preservation for ranking functions)

Let Δ be weakly consistent.

There is an extended c-representation $\kappa_{\vec{\eta}}$ of Δ such that $\kappa_{\vec{\eta}}(\omega) < \infty$ iff $\omega \not\models_{\Delta}^p \perp$.

Definition (c-inference, \vdash_{Δ}^c [Beierle, Eichhorn, Kern-Isberner 2016])

Let Δ be a strongly consistent.

B is a *c-inference* from A in the context of Δ , denoted by $A \vdash_{\Delta}^c B$,
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Extended c-Inference: Example

Let $\Sigma = \{b, p, f\}$ and $\Delta = \{(b|p), (f|b), (\bar{b}|p)\}$.

ω	$(b p)$	$(f b)$	$(\bar{b} p)$	impact on ω
bpf	v	v	f	η_3
$bp\bar{f}$	v	f	f	$\eta_2 + \eta_3$
$b\bar{p}f$	—	v	—	0
$b\bar{p}\bar{f}$	—	f	—	η_2
$\bar{b}pf$	f	—	v	η_1
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We can see that, e.g., $\bar{p}\bar{f} \sim_{\Delta}^{ec} \bar{b}$.

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Properties of Extended c-Inference

Proposition

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- ✓ *Extended c-Inference satisfies $A \vdash_{\Delta}^{ec} \perp$ iff $A \vdash_{\Delta}^p \perp$. (Classic Preservation)*
- 😊 ✓ *Extended c-inference complies with syntax splitting.*

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Thank you for your attention.